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  1 
 
Abstract 
 
In the late 1670’s to early 1680’s, Leibniz came to hold that the laws of nature are 
paradigmatically contingent, that they provide the basis for a new argument from design, 
and that they presuppose the existence of active, goal-directed powers reminiscent of 
Aristotelian entelechies.  In this essay, I argue that the standard view according to which 
Leibniz forges these signature theses in the domain of physics and opportunistically 
carries them over to the domain of optics gets things essentially the wrong way around.  
The crucial nexus of views at the heart of Leibniz’s mature philosophical understanding 
of the laws of nature has its most intelligible roots in his optical derivations, which appear 
to have paved the way – both historically and conceptually – for the philosophical 
significance he assigns to his discoveries in the domain of physics.  Optics the horse, as it 
were, physics the cart.  
  2 
Introduction 
 
Leibniz’s mature philosophical understanding of the laws of nature emerges rather 
suddenly in the late 1670’s to early 1680’s and is signaled by his embrace of three central 
theses.
1  The first, what I’ll call the thesis of Contingency, suggests that the laws of 
nature are not only contingent, but, in some sense, paradigmatically contingent; the
supposed to provide insight into the very nature of contingency as Leibniz comes to 
understand it.  The second, what I’ll call the thesis of Providence, suggests that the laws 
of nature provide a basis for a new argument from design by showing how reflection on 
God’s ends can be positively useful in the practice of natural philosophy.  The third, what 
I’ll call thesis of Entelechies, insists that the actual laws of nature must be grounded in 
goal-directed, teleological natures, which vindicate, in at least some measure, the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition’s postulation of immanent teleology. 
y are 
                                                
In trying to understand his embrace of these three theses, Leibniz’s commentators 
have typically looked to his work in dynamics, and in particular to his famous 
“discovery” of the law of the conservation of vis viva and his concomitant rejection of 
Descartes’s law of the conservation of quantity of motion.
2  And not without reason.  For 
 
1 Margaret Wilson previously drew attention to these three theses in her seminal paper, 
“Leibniz’s Dynamics and Contingency in Nature,” (Wilson, 1976). The title of the 
present paper is, of course, an allusion to her title.   
2 “Discovery” in scare quotes because the technical result that Leibniz seizes upon, and 
does so much to develop philosophically, was already available in the work of his 
  3Leibniz clearly came to see his work on the laws of motion and impact as lending 
important support to his mature philosophical understanding of the laws of nature.  Thus, 
for example, in a passage indicative of the thesis of Contingency, he tells us, “this great 
example of the laws of motion shows us with the utmost clarity how much difference 
there is between these three cases . . . first, an absolute necessity, . . . second a [merely] 
moral necessity . . . and finally third something absolutely arbitrary” (T 349, see also G 
III 645).
 3  In a passage that recalls the thesis of Providence, he relates, “since we have 
                                                                                                                                                 
predecessors, and in particular in the work of Christiaan Huygens with whom Leibniz 
studied while in Paris (1672-1676).  For helpful discussion of influences on Leibniz’s 
work on the laws of physics, see especially, chapter 4 of Gueroult (1967), chapters 4-6 of 
Westfall (1971), as well as Westfall (1984) and Bos (1978). See also the references in 
footnote 4 below.         
3 I will use the following abbreviations for Leibniz’s works (full citations available in the 
reference section):  A = German Academy of Sciences (ed.) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:  
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, (Leibniz, 1923-), reference is to series, volume and page.  
AG = R. Ariew and D. Garber (eds. and trans.) G. W. Leibniz:  Philosophical Essays, 
(Leibniz, 1989), reference is to series, volume and page.  DM = G. W. Leibniz, 
“Discourse on Metaphysics,” in G IV 427-63, reference is to section number.  FW = R. 
Franks and R. Woolhouse (eds.) G. W. Leibniz:  Philosophical Texts, (Leibniz, 1988).  G 
= C. I. Gerhardt (ed.) Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 7 
volumes (Leibniz, 1875-1890), reference is to volume and page.  Gerland = Ernst 
Gerland, Leibnizens Nachgelassene Schriften Physikalischen, Mechanischen und 
Technischen Inhalts (Leibniz, 1906), reference is to section number.  GM = C. I. 
  4always recognized God’s wisdom in the detail of the mechanical structure of some 
particular bodies, it must also be displayed in the general economy of the world and in 
the constitution of the laws of nature . . . one can observe the counsels of this wisdom in 
the laws of motion in general” (DM 21, see also T 345).  Finally, in a passage supportive 
of the thesis of Entelechies, Leibniz tells us, “Certain things take place in a body which 
cannot be explained from the necessity of matter alone.  Such are the laws of motion, 
which depend upon the metaphysical principle of the equality of cause and effect.  
Therefore we must deal here with the soul and show that all things are animated” (A 
VI.iv.1988/L 278, see also DM 18, 21, 23).     
Without wishing to deny that Leibniz’s work in dynamics came to play an 
important role in his thinking about the philosophical foundations of the laws of nature, 
in the three sections that follow I would like to draw attention to an alternative source of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gerhardt (ed.) G. W. Leibniz:  Mathematische Schriften, 7 volumes (Leibniz, 1849-63), 
reference is to volume and page.  L =  L. E. Loemker, (ed. and trans.) Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz:  Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2
nd Edition, (Leibniz, 1969).  LC = Richard 
Arthur (ed. and trans.) The Labyrinth of the Continuum, Writings on the Continuum 
Problem, 1672-1686, (Leibniz, 2001).  LH = Eduard Bodemann, Die Leibniz-
Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover (Leibniz, 1889) 
reference is to folio number and page.  NE = G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human 
Understanding, in A.VI.6; reference is to book, chapter, section.  NI = G. W. Leibniz, 
“On Nature Itself,” in G IV 504-16; SD = G. W. Leibniz, “A Specimen of Dynamics,” in 
GM 6: 235-54, reference is to part and paragraph. T = G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy in G VI; 
English translation by E. M. Huggard (Leibniz, 1985), reference is to section number.  
  5his commitment to the theses of Contingency, Providence, and Entelechies.  Each of the 
three following sections accordingly takes up one of Leibniz’s signature theses and 
argues that it is best understood as arising out of his work in geometrical optics rather 
than out of his studies in dynamics.  The intended moral of the three sections taken 
together is that, while it has been tempting to suppose that Leibniz forges the central 
theses of his mature understanding of the laws of nature in the domain of physics and 
opportunistically carries them over to the domain of optics, such a story appears to get 
things essentially the wrong way around.  The crucial nexus of views at the heart of 
Leibniz’s mature philosophical understanding of the laws of nature has its most 
intelligible roots in his optical derivations, which appear to have paved the way – both 
historically and conceptually – for the philosophical significance he assigns to his 
discoveries in the domain of physics.  Optics the horse, as it were, physics the cart. 
 
Contingency 
 
The most promising strategy for directly linking Leibniz’s embrace of Contingency with 
his work in dynamics centers on his derivation of the conservation of vis viva as 
presented in his Brief Demonstration of 1686 and elsewhere (GM VI 117-119/L 296-302; 
GM VI 234-254/AG 117-138; GM VI 287-92/AG 105-111).
4  In those derivations, 
                                                 
4 For discussion of Leibniz’s derivations of the conservation of vis viva as well as the 
controversy to which it helped give birth, see especially, Laudan (1968), Gale (1973), 
Iltis  (1974) and (1979), Garber (1995), and Smith (2006).  See also the references in 
footnote 2 above.   
  6Leibniz argues that the conservation of vis viva follows from – among other things – the 
principle of the equality of cause and effect, that is, the principle that “the same sum of 
motive force should be conserved in nature and not be diminished – since we never see 
force lost by one body without being transferred to another” (GM VI 117/L 296).  
Assuming that the equality principle holds contingently, one might imagine that since the 
conservation of vis viva can be, or even must be, grounded in, or derivable from, a 
contingent feature of the world, it must itself be a contingent feature of the world.
5  And, 
indeed, Leibniz appears to endorse this line of thought in several texts, including a 
passage from the Theodicy in which he emphasizes, “I discovered at the same time that 
the laws of motion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are not in 
reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be . . . They do not 
spring entirely from the principle of necessity, but rather from the principle of perfection 
and order . . . I can demonstrate these laws in diverse ways, but must always assume 
something that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity” (T 345, see also DM 21).   
  While the suggestion that the laws of nature must be contingent because they 
follow from contingent principles clearly plays a role in Leibniz’s mature thinking about 
the laws of nature, as an account of how he came to embrace Contingency, it meets with 
two formidable difficulties.
6   
                                                 
5 See especially of Garber (1995, pp. 319-20; forthcoming, ch. 4).  See also in Wilson 
(1976, pp. 428-431), Posner (1984), Okruhlik (1995).     
6 Setting aside, of course, concerns over the argument’s validity:  since nothing precludes 
the derivation of a necessary truth from contingent premises, it is not clear why it should 
not be possible to derive even a necessary law from a contingent principle.   
  7The first is an historical worry:  in his early studies of the laws of motion and 
impact, Leibniz insists, and repeatedly attempts to prove, that the equality of cause and 
effect holds of absolute necessity.
7  Indeed, Daniel Garber has recently argued that we do 
not find clear textual evidence of Leibniz’s commitment to the contingency of the 
equality principle before December 1679 (A2.1.495/L 272).
8  In that case, however, 
appealing to the equality principle in order to explain Leibniz’s embrace of Contingency 
would seem to merely push things back a step.  For even granting that his understanding 
of the modal status of the laws of nature was influenced by his understanding of the 
modal status of the equality principle, we should still like to know, what might have led 
Leibniz, sometime around the late 1670’s to early 1680’s, to change his mind about the 
modal status of the equality principle itself?
 9   
The second difficulty is one of conceptual fit:  although Leibniz insists that the 
laws of nature provide a model of his mature view of contingency, neither the 
                                                 
7 See, especially, Leibniz (1675). See also, A VI.iv.1963-4.          
8 Garber (forthcoming, ch. 6).   
9 Responding to essentially this challenge, Daniel Garber (forthcoming, ch. 6) has 
suggested that Leibniz’s conversion might have been spurred by his frustration in proving 
the equality principle and his growing awareness of the threat posed by Spinoza’s 
rejection of final causes.  As Garber himself notes, however, such an account faces an 
important objection in that, already early in his career, Leibniz seems to have 
distinguished quite clearly between teleological providence on the one hand, and 
contingency on the other, arguing that the creation of the world might be both 
providential and necessary (see, for example, A VI.iii.364; A VI.iii.370).   
  8conservation of vis viva nor the equality principle seem like especially compelling or 
illuminating examples of Leibnizian contingency in nature.  The conservation of vis viva 
is, of course, a striking and elegant law in its own right, and even plausibly contingent.  
But much the same could be said of almost any candidate law of nature.  Indeed, it is hard 
to see why the conservation of vis viva, per se, should be thought to be a better example 
of contingency in nature than, say, Descartes’s conservation of the quantity of motion.  
The equality principle is likewise admittedly striking and elegant in its own right.  But it, 
in particular, seems like an unlikely original paradigm of contingency for Leibniz given 
his early attempts to establish that it is essentially an analytic truth.  Thus, although both 
the conservation of vis viva and the equality principle might be interpreted in a way that 
is consistent with the thesis of Contingency, neither seems to be an especially suggestive 
example of Leibniz’s mature understanding of contingency in nature.   
Leibniz’s work in geometrical optics promises solutions to both of these 
difficulties, and in doing so points the way towards a more sympathetic account of his 
embrace of the thesis of Contingency.   
The foundations for a better model of Leibniz’s mature understanding of 
contingency are clearly on display in his relatively late and well-known Tentamen 
Anagogicum of 1696 (G VII 270-9/L 485).  In that piece he offers a pair of sophisticated 
derivations of the two central laws of geometrical optics, the law of reflection and the law 
of refraction.
10  Trigonometric inferences aside, we can think of Leibniz’s proofs as each 
involving two main steps, which might be intuitively illustrated in the case of reflection, 
                                                 
10 A more detailed discussion of Leibniz’s optical derivations may be found in 
McDonough (forthcoming). See also, McDonough (2008).     
  9using a simplified version of Leibniz’s own diagram, by letting ACB represent a 
reflecting surface (straight, concave or convex), F a light source, and G a light sink (e.g. 
an eye).  (See Figure 1) 
In the first step, Leibniz constructs an equation capable of describing an infinite 
family of bent paths that a ray of light might take from its source to its sink.  That family 
of paths can be depicted in the diagram by letting C be any point on ACB, so that FCG 
will represent any of the infinitely many bent paths that the ray of light might travel from 
its source at F to its sink at G.  In the second step, Leibniz draws on his newly developed 
calculus to pick out the one path that is locally determinate with respect to “ease,” where 
ease is a measurement of distance times resistance; he identifies that path with the actual 
trajectory of the ray of light under idealized conditions.  As Leibniz is eager to show, 
essentially the same two stage derivation can be applied to solve a range of cases 
involving refraction as well.   
The “optimization approach,” or “optimization strategy,” employed in the 
Tentamen to derive the laws of reflection and refraction provides Leibniz with a 
remarkably good model of his mature understanding of contingency taken as a modality 
falling between what is absolutely necessary and what is absolutely arbitrary.  For, on the 
one hand, the mathematically rigorous description of infinitely many possible but non-
actual paths suggests that the behavior of light is not governed by an “absolute 
necessity.”  On the contrary, it straightforwardly implies that a ray of light setting out 
from, for example, the point F could reach the point G by being reflected at any of 
infinitely many points C´ rather than C.  On the other hand, the identification of the actual 
path of a ray of light on the basis of a uniquely identifying property implies that the 
  10behavior of light is not governed by simple chance, that it is not “something absolutely 
arbitrary.”  A ray of light does not randomly take any of the infinitely many possible 
paths from its source to its sink, but rather selects, as it were, the one path that is uniquely 
the “easiest.”     
If Leibniz’s derivations in the Tentamen provide a better conceptual fit with his 
mature understanding of contingency in nature, they also suggest a possible solution to 
the historical difficulty raised above.  For Leibniz’s discovery that the laws of nature 
could be derived from axioms such as the easiest path principle might have led him to 
reconsider his earliest understanding of the modal status of the laws of nature in general 
and the equality principle in particular.  That is to say, Leibniz’s encounter with the 
optimization approach to the laws of optics might not only have provided him with his 
best examples of his mature understanding of contingency in nature, but also played a 
central role in his forming and embracing the thesis of Contingency.   
Although the evaluation of such an hypothesis is made more challenging by the 
fact that most of Leibniz’s optical writings remain unedited, and thus undated, a careful 
investigation of those that are currently available lends it strong support.  More 
specifically, the optical texts which are now accessible, and can be dated in one way or 
another with confidence, provide good evidence for the three following claims:  (1) In the 
early 1670’s, Leibniz appears to have either been unaware of, or at least uninterested in, 
the sorts of non-mechanical derivations that figure so centrally in the Tentamen.  (2) By 
1677 at the latest – still roughly two years prior to our best dating of his change of mind 
with respect to the modal status of the equality principle – Leibniz hit upon, and applied 
to the case of reflection, what is clearly a precursor of his mature easiest path principle.  
  11(3) During the late 1670’s to early 1680’s, that is, during the period in which his mature 
understanding of contingency appears to have taken firm root, Leibniz was vigorously 
engaged in working out the technical and philosophical implications of the optimization 
approach to the laws of optics.  With the overarching structure of the relevant evidence in 
mind, let us look in a little more detail at the textual support that can be marshaled for 
each of these three claims.   
 (1) The textual evidence in support of the first claim is provided by a family of 
texts, datable to the early 1670’s, which collectively give a good preliminary picture of 
Leibniz’s early interest in, and approach to, the study of geometrical optics.  They include 
a short published piece entitled Notitia Opticae Promotae ([1671] 1768, pp. 14-15), a 
long section from his Hypothesis Physica Nova ([1671] A VI.ii.228-231.section 22), 
dated letters to Spinoza ([October 1671] A II.i.252-4), Oldenburg ([April 1673] A 
II.i.165-169) and Marriotte ([July 1673] A.II.i.369-73), and, most helpfully for our 
purposes, a series of three optical studies, fortuitously edited by the Akademie editors of 
Leibniz’s philosophical writings and dated to 1671 (A VI.ii.309-323).
11  Significantly, in 
none of these texts does Leibniz give any indication that he is at all interested in, or even 
aware of, the optimization approach to the laws of optics.  That absence is especially 
salient in his derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction from this period, which 
make use only of broadly efficient, broadly mechanistic resources.  So, for example, in a 
proof from one of the texts edited by the Akademie editors, and given the title 
Demonstration of the Laws of Reflection and Refraction, Leibniz proposes to derive the 
                                                 
11 See also Gerland 14, which, although undated, most likely originates from this early 
period as well.   
  12two central laws of geometrical optics by considering how the impetus of a body A 
would be affected by its impact with a surface bc (A VI.ii.309-312).  (See Figure 2) 
Leibniz’s interesting proof is not without it its own insights and innovations.  To 
take just one example, in it he argues that reflection presupposes something like elasticity 
in the body being reflected – a point he imaginatively illustrates by noting that children 
shooting (inelastic) spit balls at flies on a window pane, will aim at a spot in front of a fly 
since “even if the spitball doesn’t straightaway reach the place at which the fly sits, it will 
still be carried there and strike the fly” (A VI.ii.310).
12  In spite of such novelties, 
however, the general approach of Leibniz’s derivation follows quite closely the familiar 
Cartesian strategy of first decomposing the tendency of a ray of light into orthogonal 
tendencies, next evaluating those orthogonal tendencies at impact independently of one 
another, and finally recombining the relevant tendencies to determine the angle of 
reflection or refraction.
13  In short, in spite of their ambition and inventiveness, Leibniz’s 
optical derivations from the early 1670’s suggest that, at that time, he had not yet 
attached any significance, or begun to apply himself, to the optimization approach to the 
study of laws of optics.   
                                                 
12 Unde pueri cum factis ex charta humida globulis per calamos in muscas fenestrarum 
angulis insistentes collineant, sentiunt globulum oblique in vitrum emissum, etiamsi in 
locum cui musca insidet recta non pervenerit, per planum tamen laeve illuc deferri et 
ferire.   
13 See especially Descartes’ La Dioptrique first and second discourses (1964-76, pp. 80-
105).     
  13(2) The textual evidence that Leibniz nonetheless hit upon the optimization 
approach to the laws of optics by the mid-1670’s is provided most directly by a text, 
transcribed and published in 1906 by Ernst Gerland, that, although unedited, is 
fortunately dated in Leibniz’s own hand to 1677 (Gerland 29).
14  Interestingly, the text 
begins with a criticism – to which Leibniz returns in his later writings – of Descartes’s 
attempt to explain the refraction of light by analogy to a ball’s moving from a smooth 
                                                 
14 Less direct, but still significant, support is provided by two short pieces dated and 
edited by the Akademie editors of Leibniz’s philosophical writings.  The first, tentatively 
dated to December 1676, reads in part, “A necessary being acts through the simplest.  For 
among infinitely many possibilities certain ones are the simplest, but those simplest 
furnish the most.  The reason for this is because there is no reason which determines the 
others.  Harmony is this very thing, a certain simplicity in a multitude.  [Ens necessarium 
agere per simplicissima.  Nam ex infinitis possibilibus sunt quedam simplicissima, sed 
simplicissima quae plurimum praestant.  Cuius rei ratio est, quia nulla est ratio quae 
caetera determinet.  Harmonia hoc ipsum est, simplicitas quedam in multitudine.]” (A 
VI.iii.587-8).  The second, tentatively dated to 1677-78, reads in part, “Everything in 
nature can be demonstrated both through final causes and through efficient causes.  
Nature does nothing in vain, nature acts through the shortest paths provided they are 
regular.  Hence the shortest paths are to be sought not in refracting surfaces themselves 
but in tangents [Omnia in tota natura demonstrari possunt tum per causas finales, tum 
per causas efficientes.  Natura nihil facit frustra, natura agit per vias brevissimas modo 
sint regulares.  Hinc viae brevissimae quaerendae non in superficiebus ipsis 
refringentibus sed in tangentibus].” (A VI.ivB.1367; cited in Garber (forthcoming, ch. 6).   
  14polished surface to a surface covered by a woolen cloth.
15  Concluding that “it is certain 
that Descartes has not rendered the true cause of refraction,” Leibniz goes on to note that 
“Ptolemy and Heron and other ancients have used another easiest principle, namely of 
path, by which a ray could travel from one given point to another given point.  For surely, 
[if] a ray reflected by the surface BD arrives at C, the question is by which path, or at 
which point B [the ray is reflected].
16  (See Figure 3) 
In the short poof that follows, Leibniz explains that the “point B should be taken 
such that the straight line AB + BC conjoined is the minimum of all the other straight 
lines conjoined as AD + DC (that is, having taken any other point D).  It is easy to show 
that this happens if the angles ABE and CBD are equal,” that is, if the angle of incidence 
is equal to the angle of reflection.
17  This simple derivation clearly lacks the full 
sophistication of Leibniz’s later Tentamen proofs – it gives no indication, for example, of 
how one might similarly derive the law of refraction, or how the methods of the calculus 
                                                 
15 See, Descartes (1964-1976, pp. 93-10; most specifically at p. 103); Leibniz returns to 
the example most significantly in ([1682]1768, 3:147-8), but also in Gerland 21, 24 (both 
undated).   
16  “. . . certum est, Cartesium veram refractionis causam non reddidisse.  Ptolemaeus et 
Heron aliique veteres alio usi sunt principio facillimo scilicet via, qua scilicet radiatio à 
dato puncto ad datum punctum pervenire potuit.  nempe à puncto A radius à superficie 
BD reflexus pervenit in C, quaeritur, qua via seu qualenam sit punctum B . . .”  
17 . . . punctum B debere sumi tale, ut recta AB + BC aggregatum sit aliorum quorumlibet 
aggregatorum, ut AD + DC (alio scilicet quolibet puncto D sumto) minimum.  Quod 
facile ostenditur fieri, si anguli ABE et CBD sint aequales.   
  15might be applied to facilitate the discovery of “optimal paths.”  Nonetheless, it is equally 
clear that the central idea with respect to Contingency is already present, namely, that the 
actual path of a ray of light might be thought of as one of an infinite family of possible 
paths selected for on the basis of a uniquely determining property.  We therefore have 
good evidence that by 1677 at the latest, roughly two years before he apparently changed 
his mind concerning the modal status of the equality principle, Leibniz was at least aware 
of, and had begun to work on, the optimization approach to the laws of optics. 
(3) The textual evidence that Leibniz quickly appreciated the power and 
significance of that approach is provided by a fairly large family of datable texts.  
Perhaps the earliest of these texts is another piece that has been fortunately edited by the 
Akademie editors of Leibniz’s philosophical writings, and has been dated by watermark 
to Summer 1678- Winter 1680-1 (A VI.ivB.1393-1405/LOC 237-257).  In it, Leibniz first 
offers a broadly mechanistic derivation of the law of reflection, and then immediately 
afterwards offers essentially the same non-mechanistic derivation as found in the 1677 
piece, drawing the conclusion, more familiar from the Tentamen, that “All the 
phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no 
efficient cause; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient 
causes, as if there were no final cause” (A VI.ivB.1403/LOC 253; cf. G VII 273/L 279; A 
VI.ivB.1367).  Five other unedited pieces, one from 1679, and four from 1681, all dated 
in Leibniz’s own hand, show him vigorously engaged in working out the mathematical 
side of the optimization approach to the laws of optics (Gerland 32; Gerland 30; LH 
  16XXXVII.ii.66-67; LH XXXVII.ii.68-69; LH XXXVII.ii.70-73).
18  These studies can be 
seen as culminating in the publication of one of Leibniz’s most important scientific 
papers, his Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics and Dioptrics, published in the June 
1682 edition of the Acta Eruditorum.  This remarkable and elegant paper contains all of 
the most important technical achievements more commonly associated with the much 
later Tentamen, including, most centrally, the presentation of a single optimization 
principle applicable to both cases of reflection and refraction.  Collectively these texts 
give absolutely solid evidence that by the early 1680’s at the latest, Leibniz had not only 
become fully acquainted with the optimization approach to the laws of optics, but indeed 
had become one of its most sophisticated defenders.     
Although a full and detailed account of the development of Leibniz’s optical 
studies must await the publication of Series VIII of the Akademie edition of his scientific, 
medical and technical writings, the datable texts currently available nonetheless already 
lend strong support to the hypothesis that Leibniz’s embrace of Contingency was driven 
not so much by his work in dynamics, as by his studies in geometrical optics.  The two 
sections that follow will offer further indirect evidence for such a re-reading of Leibniz’s 
                                                 
18 Electronic copies of LH XXXVII.ii.66-67; LH XXXVII.ii.68-69; LH XXXVII.ii.70-73 
are now helpfully available on-line through the website of the Berlin-Brandenburgischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften at http://ritter.bbaw.de/ritter.  A particularly succinct 
example of the growing mathematical sophistication of Leibniz’s optical derivations can 
be found in Gerland 30 (dated December 1681) which shows Leibniz using his “method 
of tangents” to identify a local inflection point by setting the first derivative of an 
equation describing the path of a ray of light equal to zero.   
  17intellectual development by arguing that his engagement with the optimization approach 
to the laws of optics in the late 1670’s to early 1680’s also helps to make more 
intelligible his concurrent adoption of the theses of Providence and Entelechies.   
 
Providence 
 
It has been tempting to suppose that Leibniz’s embrace of Providence can be traced back 
to his work in dynamics through his embrace of the thesis of Contingency and his 
commitment to the principle of sufficient reason.  That is, it has been tempting to imagine 
that Leibniz’s discovery of the conservation of vis viva led him to the conclusion that the 
laws of nature are contingent, and that that conclusion, when paired with his commitment 
to the principle of sufficient reason, led him to the conclusion that the laws of nature must 
be rooted in divine providence.  For if the laws of nature are contingent, the principle of 
sufficient reason will insist that there must be a reason for the actual laws of nature 
holding.  But what reason could there be for the actual (contingent) laws of nature 
holding other than God’s providential intention (cf. Bennett 2001, 267; Wilson 1976) 
441-3)? 
  Although Leibniz might well have approved of such a line of thought, as an 
attempt to explain how he came to embrace the thesis of Providence, it meets with a pair 
of difficulties similar to those raised in the last section.  Indeed, the first such difficulty is 
a straightforward consequence of the historical worry encountered in connection with the 
thesis of Contingency.  For if, as has been argued, Leibniz’s discoveries in physics cannot 
account for his embrace of Contingency then they cannot in turn account for his embrace 
  18of Providence as arising out of his commitment to Contingency and the principle of 
sufficient reason.  The results of the previous section, however, provide and immediate 
and now obvious solution to that difficulty:  for Leibniz’s work in geometrical optics 
could have led him to see the laws of nature as contingent, and, in doing so, set the stage 
for a generic argument for divine providence based on the principle of sufficient reason. 
The second, more interesting difficulty concerns the explanatory power of the 
traditional story that runs through the contingency of the laws of nature and the principle 
of sufficient reason.  For, although the traditional story offers a generic argument for a 
providential creation which Leibniz certainly could have accepted, it provides no insight 
into how he might have arrived at the distinctive features of his mature views on divine 
teleology.  That is say the traditional story provides no insight into why Leibniz’s 
understanding of divine providence suddenly takes the shape that it does in the late 
1670’s to early 1680’s.   
It is with respect to this second difficulty that Leibniz’s work in geometrical 
optics proves surprisingly helpful.  For a closer look at the defining themes of Leibniz’s 
mature conception of divine teleology suggests that his derivations of the laws of 
reflection and refraction do not merely provide a premise in an otherwise independent 
argument for a providential creation, but instead deeply inform his mature understanding 
of divine providence and its relationship to the study of the natural world as it emerges in 
pieces such as his Two Sects of Naturalists ([ca. 1677-1680] A VI. ivB.1384-88/AG 281-
84), Letter to Molanus ([ca. 1679] A II.i.499-504/AG 240-45), and The Discourse on 
  19Metaphysics ([1686] G IV 427-63/AG 35-68).
 19 Let us consider three of those themes in 
turn.   
As a first theme, especially clear in Two Sects of Naturalists, the mature Leibniz 
maintains that a proper understanding of divine providence must steer a middle course 
between, on the one hand, the extreme of necessitarianism, which he associates with 
Descartes and Spinoza, and, on the other hand, a commitment to brute contingency, 
which he associates with Hobbes and Gassendi (A VI.ivB.1384-1386/AG 281-282; cf. A 
VI.ivC 1384-5; T 349/G VI 321; G VI 50).  The key to this middle path, according to 
                                                 
19 That mature view may be contrasted with Leibniz’s understanding of providence in the 
early 1670’s as witnessed especially in his twin studies the Theoria Motus Abstracti, and 
the Hypothesis Physica Nova (also known as the Theoria Motus Concreti) (A VI.ii.258-
276; A VI.ii.221-257; cf. A.VI.ii.314).  In those works, Leibniz distinguishes between, on 
the one hand, the fundamental, “pure,” or “private” laws of motion and impact as 
presented in the Theoria Motus Abstracti, and, on the other hand, the derived or “public” 
laws of nature as presented in the Theoria Motus Concreti.  The former, Leibniz suggests, 
although necessary and knowable a priori, are nonetheless consistent with divine 
providence insofar as they follow from the divine will and intellect (A VI.ii.160; A 
VI.iii.364).  The latter, Leibniz implies, are contingent, and knowable only with the aid of 
at least some experience; in his studies from the early 1670’s, they are taken to provide 
the most obvious evidence of God’s providential design in nature (see, for example, 
A.VI.ii.255).  For a helpful overview of Leibniz’s early natural philosophy, and for 
further sources, see, for starters, Hannequin (1908, pp. 17-226). See also Beeley (1999), 
and Garber (forthcoming, ch. 1).     
  20Leibniz, lies in recognizing that in creating the actual world God selects the best from a 
range of possible alternatives.  Leibniz thus sees defenders of necessitarianism as 
threatening providence by (among other things) denying that there are genuine 
alternatives to the actual laws of nature (see, for example AVI.iv.1385/AG 282), and 
defenders of brute contingency as endangering divine teleology by (among other things) 
implying that God acts not for the sake of the best but rather out of whim or fancy (see, 
for example, DM 2-3).  In both his favored middle course, as well as in his very 
characterization of the philosophical terrain, it is not hard to see the influence of 
Leibniz’s “optimization” derivations.  For those derivations might easily be interpreted 
by a pious defender of divine providence as suggesting that God selects the uniquely best 
laws of nature from an infinite range of alternative laws.  In this way, Leibniz could see 
his optimization derivations as providing a powerful model not only for his mature 
understanding of contingency, but also for his considered views on divine providence and 
its relationship to the natural world (see, most strikingly, G VII 302-8/AG 149-155).    
As a second theme, Leibniz suggests that explanations of natural phenomena 
should be approachable both in terms of God’s providential reasons and in terms of 
broadly mechanistic efficient causes.  He thus insists, for example, in the Discourse on 
Metaphysics that “authors who follow these different routes should not malign each 
other,” and declares that one may “recognize and praise the skill of a worker not only by 
showing his designs in making the parts of his machine, but also by explaining the 
instruments he used in making each part” (DM 22).  In the same piece he writes 
explicitly:  
  21I even find that several effects of nature can be demonstrated doubly, that is, by 
considering first the efficient cause and then by considering the final cause, 
making use, for example, of God’s decree always to produce his effect by the 
easiest and most determinate ways, as I have shown elsewhere in accounting for 
the rules of catoptrics and dioptrics. (DM 21; cf A VI.ivB.1384-1388/AG 281-
284; A II.i501/AG 242; GM VI 243/AG 126)    
This passage, of course, echoes a lesson we saw Leibniz draw in his early work 
Metaphysical Definitions and Reflections from 1678-1680.  For, already in that piece, we 
found him explicitly arguing that the law of reflection may be derived both from the 
“way of final causes” by asking after the “best” path that a ray of light might take from its 
source to its sink, and mechanistically by considering how the motions of a body would 
be affected by its collision with a surface impeding its movement in one direction 
(A.VI.iv.1404-5/LC 255).  In this way, Leibniz’s work in optics may be seen as paving 
the way, again with a striking and concrete example, for another central theme of his 
mature understanding of divine providence, namely, that it should be explanatorily 
compatible with a broadly mechanistic account of bodily interactions. 
Finally, as a third theme, sounded throughout his mature works, Leibniz insists 
over and over again that a proper defense of divine teleology should seek to show how 
consideration of God’s ends might be positively conducive to making important 
discoveries in natural philosophy.  Although he sometimes mentions in passing cases of 
well-functioning organisms in connection with this theme, his principal example in 
support of the utility of providential reasoning for making discoveries in the natural 
  22sciences simply are optimization derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction.  
Thus in a characteristic passage from the Discourse on Metaphysics, he writes:  
[T]he way of final causes is easier, but is nevertheless frequently of use in 
discovering important and useful truths, truths that would take a long time to find 
by the other, more physical route.  Anatomy provides important examples of this; 
and Snell, the first formulator of the rules of refraction, would have been a long 
time finding them, if he had tried first to find out how light is formed.  But 
evidently he followed the method which the ancients used for catoptrics, which is 
in fact that of final causes.  For by looking for the easiest way to get a ray from 
one given point to another by reflection . . . they discovered the equality of the 
angle of incidence and of reflection . . . M. Snell, as I believe, and after him . . . 
M. Fermat, have more ingeniously applied this to refraction.  Since rays in the 
same media observe the same ratio of sines as that between the resistances of the 
media, this turns out to be the easiest, or at least the most determinate route to get 
from a given point in one medium to a given point in another. (DM 22/FW 75; see 
also SD 24/FW 164; NI 4/FW 212; TA 273/L 479) 
The idea that “it is unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of things 
and then, instead of using his wisdom, use only the properties of matter to explain the 
phenomena” is central to Leibniz’s mature conception of divine providence (DM 19).  
Indeed, it is such a prevalent theme of his mature thinking that it is easy to forget what an 
ambitious – even dangerous – standard it sets for a pious defender of divine teleology.  
For, of course, it is not at all easy to show how considerations of divine ends might 
actually be useful for making genuine scientific discoveries, especially outside the 
  23domain of biology.  In Leibniz’s confidence that such a standard can nonetheless be met, 
we can see yet another way in which his optical studies might well have helped to guide 
and shape his mature views on divine providence.   
It should be acknowledged, of course, that Leibniz also came to see his mature 
views on divine providence as deriving support from his work in dynamics.  The 
connections between Leibniz’s studies in physics and his mature understanding of divine 
teleology, however, are apt to appear more strained and ad hoc.  His original commitment 
to the necessity of the equality principle makes it an unlikely source of his mature view of 
providence as the key to a middle course between the Scylla of strict necessitarianism and 
the Charybdis of brute contingency.  And, indeed, it remains somewhat ambiguous even 
in Leibniz’s mature writings whether violations of the equality principle are really, or just 
apparently, possible (see, e.g. NE IV.x.437-8; SD 31).  It is likewise hard to imagine 
Leibniz’s work in physics giving rise to his thesis that “the effects of nature can be 
demonstrated doubly, that is by considering first the efficient cause and then by 
considering the final cause” (DM 21).  For the only phenomena from physics that Leibniz 
even attempts to explain both efficiently and teleologically in the relevant way – 
phenomena such as the shape of freely hanging chains, and the quickest non-vertical 
paths of falling bodies – he treats in a manner that is obviously an extension of the 
optimization strategy first forged in his optical studies (see, for example, G VII 304-3/L 
488-9; TA 272/L 478).
20  Finally, while it is easy enough to suppose that the equality 
principle and the conservation of vis viva are consistent with a providential design, they 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed discussion of Leibniz’s extension of his optimization strategy to 
such problems, see, McDonough (forthcoming).      
  24hardly seem like promising springboards for showing that considerations of divine 
teleology are positively useful for making scientific discoveries; while Leibniz could 
plausibly imagine, as he did,
21 that the law of refraction would not have been discovered 
so soon without the aid of teleological reasoning, he could not plausibly suppose the 
same with respect to his favored conservation laws.   
Leibniz’s work in optics thus suggests a very different picture of the development 
of his mature views on divine providence and its relationship to the laws of nature than 
has traditionally been supposed.  Rather than seeing his mature understanding of 
providence as arising from his conceptually prior commitment to the contingency of the 
laws of motion and the principle of sufficient reason, it suggests that his mature 
understanding of both Contingency and Providence have a common root in his optical 
studies from the late 1670’s to early 1680’s.  This way of approaching Leibniz’s mature 
views on divine providence and its relationship to the study of the natural world promises 
not merely to explain his commitment to a providential creation – something which given 
his piety and background, perhaps, stands in need of no explanation at all – but, more 
significantly, to provide insight into the central themes that most distinctively 
characterize his mature position.  In short, Leibniz’s work in optics makes his embrace of 
                                                 
21 Although Descartes was the first person to publish the law of refraction as we know it, 
he was widely accused of having stolen his results from Willebrord Snell while residing 
in Holland.  Leibniz seems to have shared in the opinion that Descartes did not discover 
the law of refraction and that his derivations were tailored to fit an already known result 
(see, TA 274/L 479-80 and DM 22/L 317-18).  For discussion of the history of the 
dispute, see especially Korteweg (1896, pp. 489-501), and Sabra (1967).   
  25the thesis of Providence more intelligible, and in doing so lends support to the conjecture 
that his studies on the laws of reflection and refraction played a significant role in helping 
to shape his mature understanding of the laws of nature.  The next section will suggest 
that those studies similarly help to make more intelligible his embrace of the thesis of 
Entelechies.  
  
Entelechies 
 
Of the three theses that characterize Leibniz’s mature philosophical understanding of the 
laws of nature, it has perhaps been most difficult to see how his work in the natural 
sciences might lend support to his postulation of immaterial teleological natures (cf. 
Russell 1997, pp. 89; Wilson 1976, pp. 433-35; Adams 1994, pp. 378).  Insofar as there is 
a standard account linking Leibniz’s work on the laws of physics to his commitment to 
the thesis of Entelechies, it would appear to involve two steps.
22  The first step would 
move from the supposed difficulty of grounding the laws of nature in merely extended 
matter and motion to the postulation of immaterial natures or forces.  The second step 
would move from the postulation of immaterial natures or forces to the conclusion that 
those natures must also be teleological.  In this last main section, I’d like to suggest that 
Leibniz’s work in geometrical optics also helps to shed light on this especially difficult 
                                                 
22 For discussion of the relationship between Leibniz’s work in physics and his 
postulation of entelechies, see McGuire (1976, pp. 290-326), Hartz (1984, pp. 315-332), 
Garber (1985, pp. 27-130), Rutherford (1992, pp. 35-49), Adams (1994, pp. 378-399), 
Rutherford (1995, especially pp. 237-264), and Lodge (1997, pp. 116-124).  
  26aspect of his mature understanding of the laws of nature, and, more specifically, I’d like 
to suggest that his optical studies provide him with at least as good of a foundation for the 
postulation of immaterial natures, and a stronger foundation for insisting that those 
natures must also be teleological.   
Leibniz’s argument that the laws of nature must be grounded in immaterial 
natures or forces is a particular instance of a more general argument form that he employs 
in a number of different contexts.
23  That general argument might be thought of as 
beginning with a pair of background assumptions.  One is that, for the sake of argument, 
matter may be understood austerely to include essentially nothing more than concrete 
extension and its modifications; and, as a corollary, that a purely materialistic or 
mechanistic metaphysics may be taken to include nothing more than matter so understood 
together with motion taken as relative change of position.  The second assumption is that 
it must be possible for all natural phenomena to be intelligibly grounded in metaphysical 
features of the created world itself – to suppose that some phenomenon such as elasticity, 
hardness or gravity might be simply “superadded” to mechanistically conceived matter is, 
on this assumption, to have illicit recourse to perpetual miracles (see, for example, A 
VI.vi.66; G III 519; G VII 338-9/AG 314).  The two assumptions together provide 
Leibniz with a general argument form that takes as input some natural phenomenon or 
other that is plausibly inexplicable in terms of austere matter and motion, and yields as a 
conclusion that that phenomenon must ultimately be grounded in immaterial natures or 
forces.  Intuitively, the general idea is simply that we must admit the existence of some 
non-material natures or forces in order to adequately explain the existence of natural 
                                                 
23 On this general argument form, see especially, Rutherford (1992, pp. 35-49).     
  27phenomena which cannot be accounted for in terms of merely extended matter and 
motion.     
Leibniz suggests that the of the conservation of vis viva provides an instance of 
this general argument form insofar as it requires us to distinguish between a body’s 
“quantity of motion” and its “living force.”  Thus immediately after a summary 
presentation of his argument for the conservation law in Section 17 of the Discourse on 
Metaphysics, Leibniz writes in Section 18: 
This consideration, the distinction between force and quantity of motion, is rather 
important, not only in physics and mechanics . . . but also in metaphysics, in order 
to understand the principles better.  For . . . this force is something different from 
size, shape, and motion, and one can therefore judge that not everything 
conceived in body consists solely in extension and in its modifications . . . Thus 
we are once again obliged to reestablish some beings or forms they [i.e. the 
“moderns”] have banished.  And it becomes more and more apparent that . . . the 
general principles of corporeal nature and of mechanics itself are more 
metaphysical than geometrical, and belong to some indivisible forms or natures as 
the causes of appearances, rather than to corporeal mass or extension.  (DM 18) 
Put a bit more succinctly, Leibniz’s suggestion here seems to be that the conservation of 
vis viva requires us to distinguish between a body’s quantity of motion and its living 
force, and that the latter cannot be intelligibly grounded in merely extended matter and 
motion.  Thus, following the pattern of his general argument, we are supposed to be led 
from the conservation of vis viva to the conclusion that even the most basic laws of 
physics must ultimately be grounded in immaterial natures. 
  28Whatever one makes of Leibniz’s general argument, or the specific version of it 
occasioned by his derivations of the conservation of vis viva, it should be conceded, I 
think, that the laws of optics provide him with at least as good of a foundation for 
postulating immaterial natures as do the laws of physics.  For if it is plausible to assume 
that the conservation of vis viva cannot be intelligibly grounded in mere matter and 
motion, it is at least as plausible to suppose that the laws of reflection and refraction are 
similarly inexplicable without appeal to “immaterial” natures.  Indeed, dialectically 
speaking, the laws of optics would appear to offer, if anything, a better example for 
Leibniz’s purposes.  For, on the one hand, insofar as the law of the conservation of vis 
viva, and even the distinction between “quantity of motion” and “living force,” can be 
stated using only geometrical quantities akin to mass and velocity, one might feel a bit 
insecure in insisting that the laws of physics cannot be intelligibly grounded in mere 
matter and motion (cf. Sleigh 1990, pp. 117).  And, on the other hand, insofar as they 
appeal to notions such as “ease,” “resistance,” and “determinateness,” one might reckon 
the laws of optics particularly good examples of natural phenomena unlikely to be 
intelligibly rendered in terms of austere matter and motion.  The move from the laws of 
nature to the postulation of immaterial natures thus seems to be at least as well supported 
by Leibniz’s work in geometrical optics as it is by his work in physics. 
Even granting that the laws of the world must be rooted in immaterial natures, 
however, it remains a further question why those natures must also be considered 
teleological.  Drawing on our discussion just above, one might try to see Leibniz’s 
commitment to the postulation of specifically teleological natures as being rooted in the 
following line of thought:  reflection on the laws of nature must lead to the postulation of 
  29immaterial, “metaphysical” principles; such immaterial principles, however, must be 
understood on the model of goal-directed minds governed by laws of perception and 
appetite; consequently, however, those metaphysical principles must be counted not only 
as immaterial but also as teleological (cf. A VI.ivC.2008-9/L 289-9; see also, G II 262/L 
533).  Although it must put a lot of weight on a pair of fairly thin associations – on the 
one hand, between immateriality and mentality, and on the one hand, between mentality 
and final causality – this line of argument might well represent the most promising way 
for Leibniz to link his work in physics to his commitment to the thesis of Entelechies. 
  Here as well, we might begin by noting that, insofar as Leibniz’s argument for 
teleological natures is made to rest ultimately on those laws being inexplicable in terms 
of austere matter and motion, his work on the laws of optics would seem to support it at 
least as well as his work on the laws of physics.  More significantly, however, Leibniz’s 
work in geometrical optics also suggests a much more direct and intuitive argument for 
the conclusion that if there are immaterial forces grounding the laws of nature, they – or 
at least the ones grounding the laws of optics – must, in some sense, be teleological.  For 
Leibniz sees the laws of optics themselves as, in an important sense, teleological:  they 
allow us to explain the behavior of rays of light by appealing to the expected outcomes of 
their behavior.  Using Leibniz’s easiest path principle, we are thus able to say, for 
example, that a ray of light passed through point B rather than B´ in order to get to C by 
the easiest path in much the same way that we are able to say that the flower bloomed in 
order to facilitate pollination, or the bird flew south in order to avoid the cold weather.  
Whether one agrees or not that such explanations commit one to teleology within the 
  30order of nature, it is not difficult to see why Leibniz thinks that they do.
24  Granting that 
conclusion, however, he has a rather straightforward reason for thinking that at least 
some of the laws of the natural world are grounded in natures which are not just 
immaterial but also teleological, a reason, or line of reasoning, that, to its credit, does not 
rely on any associations between immateriality, mentality, and final causality.  For if it is 
granted both that the laws of optics may be understood teleologically and that they must 
be grounded in immaterial natures, it is but a small step indeed to the conclusion that 
those immaterial natures may also be understood to be in some sense teleological.  In this 
way, the laws of reflection and refraction provide Leibniz not just with another instance 
of phenomena that are plausibly inexplicable in terms of austere matter and motion, but 
also the foundations for a surprisingly straightforward defense of immanent teleology.   
In closing this section, it may be worth noting that this way of approaching 
Leibniz’s embrace of Entelechies may also help to shed light on the structure of a crucial 
stretch of the Discourse on Metaphysics.  In Sections 17 and 18 of that work, Leibniz first 
presents a summary derivation of the conservation of vis viva, and then, as we have seen, 
draws the conclusion that the laws of physics cannot grounded be “solely in extension 
and in its modifications . . . [so that] we are once again obliged to reestablish some beings 
or forms they have banished.”  Next, in Sections 19 through 22, he offers an extended 
defense of teleology that, again as we have seen, culminates in the example of the laws of 
optics, with Leibniz declaring “Snell, who first discovered the rules of refraction . . . 
followed the method which the ancients used for catoptrics, which is in fact that of final 
                                                 
24 For a limited defense of Leibniz’s characterization of principles such as the easiest path 
principle as teleological, see McDonough (forthcoming).   
  31causes.”  Finally, in Section 23, Leibniz suggests that having “found it appropriate to 
insist a bit on these considerations of final causes, incorporeal natures, and an intelligent 
cause with respect to bodies . . . It is now appropriate to return from bodies to immaterial 
natures, in particular to minds, and to say something of the means God uses to enlighten 
them and act on them.”  Given the traditional understanding of Leibniz’s embrace of 
Entelechies this structure must appear rather puzzling since according to it we should 
expect Leibniz’s defense of immanent teleology to follow, rather than precede, his 
discussion of mental natures.  The actual structure of this stretch of the Discourse, 
however, makes perfectly good sense if we see Leibniz’s work on the laws of optics as 
providing him with an argument for specifically teleological natures that does not 
presuppose the postulation of natures that are essentially mental.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Leibniz was never shy about trumpeting his discoveries in both the domains of optics and 
physics, and there should be no doubt that he came to see his work in both fields as 
supporting the central theses of what we would characterize as his mature philosophy of 
nature or science.  Nonetheless, in attempting to understand the dramatic shift in 
Leibniz’s thinking about the natural world during the crucial period following his stay in 
Paris, recent commentators have typically focused on his work on the laws of dynamics 
at the expense of his work on the laws of optics.  It has been the aim of this paper to 
show, most specifically, how Leibniz’s embrace of three of the most important themes of 
his mature understanding of the laws of nature may be rendered more intelligible when 
  32viewed against the backdrop of his derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction, 
and, more generally, to suggest that closer attention to his important work in geometrical 
optics may point the way towards a more sympathetic understanding of his mature 
natural philosophy.
25     
                                                 
25 I would like to thank Daniel Garber, Sam Levey, and Daniel Sutherland for their 
helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.  I am also grateful for assistance with 
texts provided by Drs. Eberhard Knobloch, Sebastian W. Stork, and Hartmut Hecht at the 
Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, as well as for funding for 
research in Germany provided by a Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship sponsored by the 
Journal of the History of Philosophy.      
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